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IN PRAISE OF PENSION REFORM
BY RONALD I. KIRSCHBAUM*
Many in the practicing Bar seemed to go into a state of shock
when the magnitude of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) became apparent. Noteworthy authors specu-
lated on the possibilities of survival of the small plan.' The number
of plan terminations quickly rose until they nearly equalled the
number of plan qualifications. 2
This hue and cry has not abated significantly, and journal arti-
cles continue to bemoan the horrendous complexities of the new
law.' The general practitioner attempting to advise small-business
clients must confront a myriad of new concepts, such as fiduciary
standards, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and anti-
backloading actuarial concepts. In addition, when the practitioner
turns to experts in the field, he finds them saying how nearly impos-
sible modern retirement planning is. Small wonder then that such
practitioners run for cover. However, a non-emotional analytical
view of the past five years will reveal a different picture. Instead of
the hydra-like monster ERISA has been painted to be, it represents
a system of law that is considerably more certain and easier to apply
than that at anytime in the recent past. Practitioners who do not
recognize this and who continue to refrain from using retirement
plans in corporate planning are denying their clients the most effec-
tive and one of the last available tax shelters.
This article will examine the current state of the law as com-
pared to the situation that existed prior to the passage of ERISA.
An exhaustive analysis of the intricate details of ERISA is not in-
tended. Nevertheless, a comparison of some of the most salient
provisions of pre-ERISA and post-ERISA law will reveal that things
were not all that good before September 2, 1974, and they are not
all that bad now.
* The author received the J.D. degree from the University of North Carolina
in 1967 and the LL.M. in taxation from New York University in 1968. He is a
member of the firm of Ragsdale & Kirschbaum, P.A., of Raleigh, North Carolina,
and he currently is serving on the faculties of both North Carolina State University
in Raleigh and the Campbell College School of Law.
1. Roche, ERISA and the Small Plan, 2 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, No.
2, at 99 (March, 1976).
2. During the calendar year 1976, the IRS processed a total of 21,486 initial
qualifications and 15,859 terminations. COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR PLAN
ADMINISTRATORS (C.C.H.) No. 35 (July 22, 1977).
3. Dunigan, ERISA Misfire-The Small Employer, 4 J. PENSION PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE, No. 4 (July, 1978).
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The analysis will be confined largely to defined contribution
plans. Even before ERISA, the uncertainty of actuarial funding and
the complexities of defined benefit plans made the defined contribu-
tion plan much more attractive for the small business.4 ERISA sim-
ply has accentuated this difference. The advent of the Pension Ben-
efit Guaranty Corporation and the potential of substantial employer
liabilities, together with increased complexity and operational
costs, have made defined benefit plans too expensive for many small
businesses.' Attorneys should not exclude such plans automatically
since in some situations they will prove ideal.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A comparison of the old and new laws must take into account
the historical background of legislation in this area. Congress began
its policy of substantial tax preferences for privately funded and
maintained retirement programs with the Revenue Act of 1921. This
initial legislation, together with subsequent codifications, remained
essentially skeletal. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 merely con-
tained provisions governing deductibility of contributions, basic
rules of nondiscrimination and a vague list of prohibited transac-
tions.
Perhaps this basic outline type of legislation sufficed in a sim-
pler time. By 1974, however, the private pension system was an
industry estimated to have assets in excess of 150 billion dollars and
to have millions of participants.' The nuances and complexities of
the system had long surpassed the explicit or implicit language of
the statute. There quite naturally developed, therefore, a large body
of administrative regulations and rulings designed to give guidance
where the statute failed to speak.
4. There has been a marked increase in the popularity of defined contribution
plans. In 1975, 15,319 pension and annuity plans were approved as against 14,720
stock bonus and profit-sharing plans. From January through September of 1976,
12,940 letters were issued for defined contribution plans with only 1,330 letters for
defined benefit plans. I.R. 1557 (Feb. 10, 1976), and I.R. 1968 (Nov. 19, 1976).
5. Overenthusiastic estimates of of ERISA-related costs have served to increase
apprehension. Articles in the JoURNAL OF PENSION PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE esti-
mated cost of bringing plans into compliance at $6,000-10,000 and further adminis-
trative burdens at $500-1,000. See 4 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, No. 4 (July,
1978). However, a Price Waterhouse study done for the Department of Labor
revealed that the cost of bringing a plan into compliance averaged $700. Fees were
$105 for 5500-C forms and $78 for summary annual reports. See COMPuANCE GUIDE
FOR PLAN ADMINISTRATORS, (C.C.H.) No. 59, (June 23, 1978).
6. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B.
[Vol. 1:31
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It may be observed that this is the proper relationship between
a statute and administrative interpretations. Regulatory action,
however, went far beyond interpretation. Concepts that were not
even considered by the drafters of the statute were described in the
regulations and were in common use. By way of example, the regula-
tions required that all pension plans have actuarially determined
benefits.' No mention was made of the defined contribution pension
plan. Nevertheless, the so-called "money purchase pension plan"
was in everyday use.8 What amounted to virtual bureaucratic legis-
lation went so far that speeches and letters of the Chief of the IRS
Pension Trust Division were published by the private pension serv-
ices and quickly became tantamount to law.
The Internal Revenue Service could coerce compliance with its
administrative fiat through use of the favorable determination let-
ter. Often the rules imposed went beyond published regulations and
amounted to nothing more than the individual District Director's
concept of equity and fair play. Substantial inconsistency resulted,
and compliance in one district could result in an unfavorable or
caveated determination letter in another.
The drafters of ERISA also recognized abuses in plan adminis-
tration. Those responsible for administration of an industry recog-
nized to be in the billions of dollars were largely unsupervised, and
the prohibitions against self-dealing were sketchy at best.
Obviously, the time was ripe for substantive change in the legis-
lation. This came on September 2, 1974, when President Ford signed
into law the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.1
This legislation was the culmination of years of work and consti-
tuted virtually a total overhaul of the laws governing private retire-
ment plans in this country.
. By necessity, such far-reaching legislation is complex and diffi-
cult for the private retirement system to assimilate. However, the
employer considering the adoption of a retirement program will find
that he now has available a system of laws with relatively certain
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (pre-ERISA).
8. The regulations allowed for use of the pension plan which provided for
definite contributions. Such a plan promised no specific benefits to employees. The
IRS determined that since the contributions were fixed, application of actuarial
assumptions would produce a definitely determinable benefit. Even prior to
ERISA, there has been permitted a combination of combined benefit and money
purchase plans called the target benefit or assumed benefit plan. This allows com-
putation of benefits on an actuarial basis, conversion of those benefits to annual
contributions and the making of contributions on a money purchase basis.
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) [hereinafter ERISA].
1979] ERISA
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requirements and flexible alternatives. Following is a step-by-step
description of some of the improvements afforded by the new law
which are available to the small business and its advisers.
DEFINrrION OF EMPLOYER
An employer considering the adoption of a qualified retirement
plan probably first will consider the legal requirements regarding
employee coverage. The ultimate cost to the employer to -a large
degree will be a function of the number of required participants. The
first consideration that must be given in determining the coverage
requirements is the definition of the employer who is maintaining
the plan.
Prior to the passage of ERISA, the separaton of employers into
two or more employing organizations, such as a corporation and a
partnership, was often a planning tool used to exclude substantial
numbers of participants. The law was extremely vague, and the only
real attack the Internal Revenue Service could make was a broad-
sided one based upon general principles of discrimination and eq-
uity. It was not unusual to see employees of an essentially unitary
business divided into a partnership and a corporation with substan-
tially different benefits provided for retirement. Judicial determina-
tions have held this practice to be improper in some circumstances,
but until 1974, the law remained unclear.'0 In some cases, differen-
tial treatment was even mandated, as in the case of profit-sharing
plans of affiliated corporations. The Internal Revenue Service ruled
that a qualified plan could not allow forfeitures to be reallocated to
employees of corporations in an affiliated group other than the cor-
poration that made the contribution."
The passage of ERISA virtually has ended all speculation in
this area. For purposes of coverage and benefits, the law now re-
quires all commonly controlled organizations to be aggregated as if
they were one. This includes corporations, sole proprietorships and
partnerships. The Code contains percentage tests to be used in de-
termining what organizations are under common control."
10. Employee's partnership could not be attributed to corporation solely be-
cause no control existed within the meaning of section 707(b), section 179 and
section 267(b) of the Code. Thomas Kiddie, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
1055 (1978); Packard v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 621 (1975).
11. Rev. Rul. 69-570, 1969-2 C.B. 91.
12. I.R.C. § 414(b)-414(c). Two corporations that have identity of ownership
will be deemed one entity as will a corporation and a partnership that are con-
trolled by the same individuals.
[Vol. 1:31
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ERISA
COVERAGE
Once the relevant employer is defined, the prospective contri-
butor to a qualified plan will want to ascertain who among the
employee group is to be included in the plan. Basic principles in
qualified plans of deferred compensation are designed to hold dis-
crimination against rank and file employees to a minimum. Pre-
ERISA law again resolved few uncertainties. The statute seemed to
indicate that a waiting period of up to five years was permitted.'3
The Internal Revenue Service disagreed and litigated several cases,
alleging discrimination in practice. An example of this type of litiga-
tion is Ets-Hokin & Galvan, Inc." where the court held that a five-
year waiting period was reasonable even though 90% of the other-
wise eligible employees were not participating in the plan.
The permissibility of a minimum age requirement for eligibility
was also uncertain. It was not unusual to find plans requiring five
years of service and attainment of age 30 for eligibility. When these
requirements were coupled with extended vesting schedules, such
plans often benefited very few rank and file employees.' 5
As in the case of the employer definition, ERISA made the law
clearer and more certain in the area of eligibility requirements. The
maximum age that now can be required for entrance into a plan is
25."6 An employer may require a waiting period for an employee
otherwise qualified to enter the plan. However, this period may not
exceed one year unless the plan provides for full and immediate
vesting, in which case the waiting period may be up to three years."
The statute further requires that an employee be admitted to the
plan on a date no later than six months after completion of all
eligibility requirements. 8 An employer evaluating the prospects of
establishing a plan therefore knows that each qualified employee
must become a participant no later than six months after the em-
ployee achieves one year of service and attains the age of 25.
In defining eligibility, the law now uses the term "year of serv-
ice," new under ERISA. The law defines a year of service for eligibil-
ity as any twelve-calendar-month period during which the em-
ployee puts in 1,000 or more hours of work for the employer.'" This
13. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(A), amended by ERISA.
14. 62,136 T.C.M. (P-H) (1962).
15. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 C.B. 94, 113.
16. I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A).
17. I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(B).
18. I.R.C. § 410(a)(4).
19. I.R.C. § 410(a)(3).
1979]
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definition replaces the old part-time/full-time dichotomy.20 Num-
erous relatively unique situations such as seasonal agricultural
workers and maritime workers are addressed specifically by the
statute and regulations.' The broad cross section of employees,
however, will come within the general 1,000-hour definition and
administration should be relatively easy. Contrary to prior law, the
definition does not relate to normal or customary employment, but
rather to the actual hours of employment. Marginal situations,
therefore, may require extensive record keeping.
Application of the year of service concept necessitates another
definition. The Department of Labor regulations specifically define
"hour," and the definition may be incorporated by reference into a
plan document.Y
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNITS
Prior to the passage of ERISA, one aspect of coverage was be-
coming more troublesome in North Carolina each year. This prob-
lem was the question of what to do when a collective bargaining unit
was part of the employee group. Pre-ERISA coverage requirements
did not permit exclusion of union members specifically; therefore,
the "safe harbor" percentage tests were often not applicable where
a union was involved.n If the union did not want to bargain for a
plan substantially equivalent to that desired by the employer, the
employer then had to decide whether to offer the plan as an inciden-
tal and additional benefit to the union contract or to run the risk of
possible disqualification. 2
This dilemma has been resolved under the current law by ex-
cluding collective bargaining units from the definition of employees,
if the subject of retirement planning was the topic of good faith
bargaining. 25 This does not mean that the contract must provide for
a retirement plan. If the bargaining unit opted for increased current
benefits over deferred benefits, retirement planning was nonetheless
20. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(A), amended by ERISA.
21. I.R.C. § 410(a)(3).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 2530.200b-2(b) to -2(c) (1977).
23. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(A), amended by ERISA (currently I.R.C. §
410(b)(1)(A)).
24. Loper Sheet Metal, Inc., 53 T.C. 385 (1969). A profit-sharing plan was held
to be discriminatory where it excluded union employees. The union had a plan, but
contributions were only about 1/5 of those for salaried employees. Loevsky v. Com-
missioner, 471 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1973). The fact that the employer could not
control what the union was going to bargain for was not relevant for qualifications
of the plan.
25. I.R.C. § 410(b)(2).
[Vol. 1:31
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the subject of good faith bargaining.
Once the employer is defined and permissible exclusions are
spelled out, the percentage coverage requirements and anti-
discrimination rules remain essentially the same as prior to the
passage of ERISA.
CONTRIBUTIONS
The next topic a prospective contributor should consider is the
establishment of parameters with regard to contributions. The law
prior to ERISA left much to the imagination. The statutory defini-
tions related to limitations on contributions while the minimum and
maximum levels of benefits and concomitant contributions were
established by administrative rule.26 In regard to defined benefit
plans, the Service generally held that benefits in excess of 100% of
compensation no longer fell within the realm of retirement plan-
ning.Y In the case of the undefined money purchase plan, however,
similar limitations were difficult to come by. Using the guideline of
the 100% of compensation benefit, a rule of thumb gradually
evolved that money purchase plans which provided for contribu-
tions in excess of 25% of compensation would not be permitted,
absent a showing of reasonableness in the anticipated benefits to be
provided. Isidore Goodman, the former chief of the Pension Trust
Division of the Internal Revenue Service, announced this rule in a
speech which was published and quickly picked up by the District
Directors' Offices. Within a short time, this rule of thumb became
de facto law and the District Directors went so far as to issue adverse
determination letters where money purchase plans provided for con-
tribution levels in excess of 25%.
After many years of use, the defined contribution pension plan
now has made it to the pages of the Internal Revenue Code. Limita-
tions are put on the amount that may be contributed under such a
plan each year on behalf of each participant.2 To no one's surprise,
the limitation contained in section 415(c) of the Code is 25% of the
participant's annual compensation.2'
Prior to the passage of the Pension Reform Act, no statutory
limitations existed on the dollar amount of contributions to a de-
fined contribution plan. As previously indicated, percentage limita-
tions applied, but the dollar amount of the contribution increased
26. I.R.C. § 404, amended by ERISA.
27. PENS. PLAN GUIDE (C.C.H.) 30,518K.
28. I.R.C. § 411(a)(1); I.R.C. § 415(c).
29. I.R.C. § 415(c).
ERISA19791
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without limitation as compensation to a participant increased. This
is no longer the case, and contributions on behalf of a participant
must not exceed the lesser of the 25% figure previously discussed or
$25,000, adjusted by the Secretary for inflation post-ERISA .3 This
dollar amount limitation, generally referred to as the "maximum
annual addition," must be provided for in the qualified plan. In no
event may the administrators allocate to the account of any partici-
pant an amount in excess of the maximum annual addition .3 The
Code defines the annual addition to a participant's account as being
the sum of the employer contributions, forfeitures allocated to the
participant's account32 and the lesser of the amount of the em-
ployee's contributions in excess of 6% of his compensation or one-
half of all employee contributions.
These calculations should be scrutinized closely since an error
can be costly. One common mistake is to confuse the limitations on
voluntary contributions by participants under ERISA with the max-
imum annual addition computations. As a general rule, an em-
ployee participant may contribute up to 10% of the aggregate
amount of all his compensation for all years in which he has been a
participant in the plan.3 3 This is true even if voluntary contributions
are lumped into one plan year. In making these contributions, only
6% of the current year's compensation can be contributed on a
voluntary basis without being included in that year's maximum
annual addition. Therefore, a large and perfectly permissible volun-
tary contribution can have the effect of substantially reducing the
employer's allowable addition to the account and causing a realloca-
tion of employer contributions to other participants' accounts.
Another factor that enters into the computation of the maxi-
mum annual addition is the period of time during which the limita-
tion is calculated. The regulations provide for the determination of
a "limitation year" by the employer. If the employer fails to deter-
mine a limitation year, the year automatically will be the calendar
year.3 ' Assuming a fiscal year plan and employer, failure to deter-
mine a plan limitation year may have the effect of bunching contri-
butions into one year and causing excess additions to a participant's
account which must be reallocated.
Section 415 also places limitations on the amount of benefits
that can be paid from a defined benefit plan. While the subject of
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. I.R.C. § 415(c)(2).
33. Rev. Rul. 70-658, 1970-2 C.B. 87.
34. Rev. Rul. 75-481, 1975-2 C.B. 188.
[Vol. 1:31
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defined benefit plans is beyond the scope of this article, it is neces-
sary to consider the limitation on benefits. The Code provides for
aggregate limits where more than one plan is in existence, and addi-
tional contributions to a defined benefit plan may have the effect
of limiting contributions allowed to a defined contribution plan.
If there are multiple defined contribution plans, the limitation
is simply the 25% or $25,000 figure discussed previously. Contribu-
tions for all plans are aggregated in determining a participant's
standing under these limitations. The difficulty arises, however,
when one must combine benefits under a defined benefit plan and
contributions under a defined contribution plan. Obviously, a sim-
ple addition of benefits and contributions is not appropriate since
the concepts of the two types of plans are not similar. ERISA pro-
vides what is known as the 1.4 rule for solving this problem.3 This
rule provides that no more than 140% of the total allowable limita-
tions may be provided for all plans combined. In other words, if the
full $75,000 (as adjusted) of benefits is provided under a defined
benefit plan, then only 40% of the allowable contributions can be
provided under all defined contribution plans. 6 Using the figures
from September 2, 1974, the aggregate annual addition that may be
made to any participant's account would be, in this example,
$10,000 (40% of $25,000). A defined benefit plan must spell out
specifically, as a limitation, the 1.4 rule.
Another new concept of the 1974 pension laws was the
"minimum funding standard account. 37 As defined in section
412(b), the account is, in the case of money purchase plans, simply
the amount which the employer has promised to contribute. A
credit to the account will be made for excess contributions which are
carried over from prior years. In the event that a deficit should occur
in the account, the employer is subject immediately to a 5% excise
tax and subject potentially to up to a 100% excise tax .3 This is
materially different from earlier years when an employer, experienc-
ing financial difficulties, simply would miss a pension contribution.
The law does provide for postponement of the requirement for fund-
ing with the permission of the Secretary after demonstration of
substantial business hardship. 9
As a final word on contribution limitations to defined contribu-
35. I.R.C. § 415(e)(1).
36. 1977-$84,525 (I.R. 1782); 1978-$90,150 (I.R. 1962); 1979-$98,100 (I.R.
2095).
37. I.R.C. § 412(b).
38. I.R.C. § 4971.
39. I.R.C. § 412(d).
1979] ERISA
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tion plans, a change has been made concerning the maximum
amount deductible in carryover years. It may be recalled that prior
to 1974, in a year to which a contribution carryover was applicable,
the employer was allowed a maximum 30% deduction. 0 Code sec-
tion 404(a) has been amended, and section 413(b)(7) has been added
eliminating the 30% limitation and instead providing a 25% aggre-
gate limitation. In the case of profit-sharing plans, the maximum
annual 15% deduction for contributions remains unchanged."
BENEFITS
After establishing which employees must be participants and
the level of contributions to be made on their behalf, the draftor of
a post-ERISA plan must determine the nature of benefits to be
provided. Prior to 1974, this area of the law was most ambiguous.
The regulations required that the plan must be for the participant's
retirement"2 and that such deferred benefits as an interest only
option could not be provided. 3 Similarly, benefits could not be so
heavily shifted to the survivor of a joint and survivor annuity or to
a beneficiary so as to reduce substantially the lifetime benefits of
the employee-participant." On the other hand, in order to qualify,
a plan had to defer compensation. Benefits therefor were required
to be postponed until some time in the future. 5
While ERISA has not legislated specifically in all benefit areas,
now a plan must specify certain aspects as to when and how benefits
are to be provided. First, the new law spells out the latest starting
date for provision of benefits." Payment of benefits are required to
commence no later than sixty days following the last day of the plan
40. I.R.C. § 404(a)(7), amended by ERISA. Pre-ERISA law allowed current
year's contributions plus carryover year contributions to be deducted in an amount
not to exceed 30% of compensation in the year to which the carryover contributions
were carried. Thus, an effective 30% contribution level could be achieved after the
first year of the plan.
41. I.R.C. 99 404(a)(3), 413(b)(7).
42. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 C.B. 94, 99.
43. Rev. Rul. 62-195, 1962-2 C.B. 125. It is common practice for District Direc-
tors' Offices to require the boiler plate type language for a qualified plan:
no interest only option and no annuity option providing for distribution
slower than under an annuity policy issued at age 65 with benefits paid
for life, with guaranteed payments for 20 years, may be selected, and
provided further that any difference in the amount of the vested portion
of a participant's account and the cost of the annuity contract shall be
paid to the participant or his beneficiary in cash.
44. Treas. Regs. § 1.401-11(e).
45. Treas. Regs. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (pre-ERISA).
46. I.R.C. § 401(a)(14).
[Vol. 1:31
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year during which a retiring participant attains normal retirement
age (65 if earlier), dies or is totally and permanently disabled. To
balance things out, the plan, to qualify, must provide that if a
participant terminates for reason other than retirement, death or
total and permanent disability and does not consent to distribution
of benefits in excess of $1,750 (as may be adjusted by regulation),
the employee may not be required to accept a current distribution
of benefits.47
The major change imposed by ERISA in the area of benefits to
be provided is the preference given joint and survivor annuities. The
Code requires each qualified plan which provides for benefits in
annuity form to contain a provision that mandates the payment of
a joint and survivor annuity unless the participant elects other-
wiseA' The plan must allow the participant to make an election not
to take a joint and survivor annuity. The election must be in writing
and within a reasonable time before the annuity's starting date. If
the participant does not affirmatively elect otherwise, a joint and
survivor annuity will be paid and the surviving spouse's annuity
must be at least one-half of the amount paid to the participant
during the joint lives of the annuitants. 9
VESTING
In most cases a substantial period of time elapses between the
making of the contribution on behalf of the participant and the
departure of that participant with retirement benefits. A dichotomy
of thought has existed for many years regarding proprietary rights
to those benefits during that interim period. If an employee-
participant has earned benefits for which the employer has been
granted a deduction over a period of years and the employee has not
yet reached retirement age at the time his service is terminated,
has that participant any vested rights in those benefits?
Pre-1974 rules were most general and were specifically criti-
cized in the ERISA Committee reports. The IRS conceded that the
statute did not require vesting at all and ruled to that effect. Reve-
nue Ruling 65-1785o clarified vesting requirements in the following
language: "(c) Vested Benefits. Various provisions are in use,
ranging from complete and immediate vesting through different
47. I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(B). If there will be a cash distribution on termination
of a plan and the interest of a participant is refused, the participant can be given
a paid up annuity.
48. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11).
49. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(G)(iii).
50. Rev. Rul. 53-82, 1953-1 C.B. 288; Rev. Rul. 65-178, supra notes 15 & 42.
19791 ERISA
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forms of graduated vesting, upon completion of stated service or
participation requirements and, or, reaching a specified age, to no
vesting until attainment of normal or stated retirement age." Nev-
ertheless, even pre-ERISA law required plan contributions to be for
the benefit of the employee-participants. Using this broad frame-
work, the Service raised the-possibility of discrimination in opera-
tion of plans providing slow vesting or no vesting at all. The unca-
veated favorable determination letter was used as a club to impose
requirements that could be said to have sprung only from the consci-
ence of the respective District Directors' Offices. By way of example,
some offices were moving toward a position (informally) that vesting
was a function of the number of key employee-participants. This
was particularly true in the case of professional service corporations.
The fewer the number of professionals, the faster the rate of vesting
that was required. Other offices did not take this position and were
granting favorable determination letters without caveat in the case
of small professional service corporations which provided very little
vesting for an extended time.
Even if a rapid rate of vesting were provided in a plan, pre-
ERISA law allowed divestiture for cause." An employee might find
that his earned retirement benefits were denied to him in the event
he was discharged for alcohol or drug abuse, for dishonesty or for
accepting employment with a competing employer. These terms
were defined poorly, and it does not take a great deal of imagination
to foresee potential abuse. A recent case allowed total divestiture for
accepting employment with a competitor without first obtaining the
permission of the employer.52
Perhaps more than in any other area of the law, ERISA serves
to eliminate the veritable quagmire of inconsistent and often abu-
sive vesting practices and requirements. Most uncertainties have
been eliminated, and an employer preparing a plan knows what the
permissible alternatives are. First, the "bad boy" or divestiture for
cause provisions are forbidden in a qualified plan. Next, the law
specifically spells out what service must be included in whatever
vesting schedule is adopted. It was common practice prior to ERISA
to include only service while a participant in the plan. A qualified
plan now must include all service with the employer except as fol-
lows:
1. Service before attaining age 22 (provided, however, that if
the ten-year or five-to-fifteen-year vesting schedule described below
51. Rev. Rul. 65-178, supra notes 15, 42 & 45.
52. Briggs v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1978).
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is not used, the plan may not disregard any year of service during
which the employee was a participant).
2. Service during the time that the employee declined to con.
tribute under an employee contributory plan.
3. Service during the time the employer did not maintain a
plan.
4. Seasonal and part-time service not constituting a year of
service (year of service is described above).
5. Years of service before January 1, 1971, unless the employee
had at least three years of service after December 31, 1970.
6. Years of service before the first plan year to which ERISA
applies if the service would have been disregarded under the plan
with regard to breaks in service as in effect on the applicable date.s
The statute specifies four permissible methods of vesting. The
first of these is the ten-year period of vesting described in section
411(a) (2) (A). It requires that a participant having at least ten years
of service must have a nonforfeitable right to 100% of accrued bene-
fits derived from employer contributions.5
The next permissible method of vesting is contained in Code
section 411(a)(2)(B)55 and is the so-called five-to-fifteen-year vest-
ing schedule. Under this method, a plan must vest the participant's
account in accordance with the following schedule:
YEARS OF SERVICE NONFORFEITABLE PERCENTAGE
5 25
6 30
7 35
8 40
9 45
10 50
11 60
12 70
13 80
14 90
15 or more 100
A predecessor bill to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 was much more limited in scope and failed to achieve
53. I.R.C. § 411(a)(4).
54. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A).
55. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(B).
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final passage. That bill incorporated a vesting schedule which was
called the rule of 50. This provision was carried over and adopted
in ERISA as the rule of 45 which now appears at section
411(a)(2)(C). In order to come within the ambit of the rule of 45, a
plan must provide that a participant who has completed at least five
years of service will be vested at least 50% when the sum of his years
of service and age equals or exceeds 45.56 Notwithstanding this limi-
tation, a participant who has at least ten years of service must have
a nonforfeitable right to at least 50% of accrued benefits regardless
of age. After the participant is 50% vested, the statute provides a
table of required vesting as follows:
AND THE SUM OF AGE THEN THE NON-
IF YEARS OF SERVICE AND SERVICE EQUALS FORFEITABLE
EQUAL OR EXCEED OR EXCEEDS PERCENTAGE IS
5 45 50
6 47 60
7 49 70
8 51 80
9 53 90
10 55 100
All of the foregoing rules apply to plans providing for gradual
accrual of vested benefits starting with the date of addition to a
participant's account. Some plans, however, provide for a differen-
tial vesting of benefits for each contribution. This is termed a "class
year plan" under ERISA, and the vesting schedule may not exceed
five years. Under this method of vesting, at any given point in time,
a participant may have a different vested benefit in contributions
attributable to different years.17
The Conference Committee reports under ERISA make it clear
that the approved method of vesting establishes minimum stan-
dards only.58 The Internal Revenue Service is not barred from re-
quiring more stringent vesting schedules where appropriate. To
maintain the desirable certainty in ERISA, the Committee reports
conclude that the Internal Revenue Service may not require a vest-
ing schedule greater than what commonly has been termed 4-40
vesting except in cases where actual misuse of the plan occurs in
56. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(C).
57. I.R.C. § 411(c)(4).
58. H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B.
244 at 247.
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operation. Under this method, 40% must be vested after four years
of service. Thereafter, 5% must be vested for each of the next two
years and 10% for each of the next five years. The result is 100%
vesting after eleven years of service. The IRS has announced that
the 4-40 test would be applied universally unless a "key employee
test" or a "turnover test" established by ruling was satisfied. 9 This
ruling, after substantial objection from the practicing bar, has been
repealed substantially, and 4-40 vesting generally is not being re-
quired in order to obtain a favorable determination letter. 0
As previously noted, with certain exceptions, all years of service
must be counted in determining the vested benefit of the partici-
pant in the plan. In this context, however, a totally new concept is
introduced by ERISA. This is the "break in service." A break in
service is deemed to have occurred when, during any twelve-
consecutive-month period, the employee-participant is not credited
with more than 500 hours of service.' In applying the rules of vesting
in cases where 100% vesting is provided within three years of service,
an employee who has a break in service of one year and has not
completed the service requirement prior to the break need not be
credited with service before the break.2 For administrative conveni-
ence, if an employee has a one-year break in service, the plan may
require a one-year waiting period before pre-break and post-break
service must be aggregated under the plan.63
In the defined contribution plan as defined in the statute,64 an
employee who has a one-year break in service need not be credited
for any increase in his vested percentage in pre-break benefit rules
on account of post-break service. In all other plans once an employee
has acquired any percentage of vesting, all his pre-break and post-
break service must be aggregated for all purposes. 5 An employee
who has not acquired vested rights to an accrued benefit derived
from employer contributions may lose credit for participation and
vesting purposes when he incurs a number of years of consecutive
one-year breaks in service equal to or exceeding the number of years
of service before the break in service.66
The break in service rules become very significant under the
59. Rev. Rul. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584.
. 60. Rev. Rul. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 30.
61. I.R.C. § 411(a)(6).
62. I.R.C. § 410(a).
63. I.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(B).
64. I.R.C. § 411(a)(6)(C).
65. I.R.C. § 411(a)(6).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-(6)(c)(1)(iii).
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terms of section 411(a)(7)(C) of the Code."7 This provision requires
that an employee who receives a cash distribution of nonforfeited
funds must be given the opportunity, if rehired before a break in
service has occurred, to repay to the plan the amount of benefits
that the participant received, thereby causing restoration of benefits
which otherwise would have been forfeited. This is to bring into
parity situations where distributions have occurred, and situations
where distributions have not occurred, with plan benefits postponed
until a future date. From the standpoint of the small business, the
likelihood of this provision coming into play is probably not too
great. The qualified plan must contain these cash-out/buy-back re-
strictions. The employer, therefore, cannot be sure what benefits are
actually forfeited by a terminating participant until a break in serv-
ice has occurred. Good drafting practice is to reallocate forfeitures
to other participants in the case of a profit-sharing plan or to reduce
ensuing contributions of the employer in the case of a pension plan
only after a break in service has occurred.
To round out the new vesting requirements, the new law re-
quires 100% vesting of all employee benefits upon attainment of
normal retirement age (age 65).61 Note that the statute explicitly
states normal retirement age and not retirement date under the plan
document. Thus a plan which provides for retirement at the end of
the plan year during which the participant attains age 65 must
provide for full vesting upon attainment of age 65 even if benefits
are not payable until the end of that plan year. Employee contribu-
tions must be fully vested at all times."1
ERISA goes one step further in protecting the benefits payable
to employees. The act specifically requires that a qualified plan
have a provision against assignment or alienation of participants'
benefits. Normally entitled "non-alienation," this is similar in na-
ture to spendthrift clauses inserted in other trust instruments.0
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILrTY
Prior to the passage of ERISA, federal legislation largely con-
fined itself to coverage, benefits, deductibility of contributions and
taxability of distributions. A broad, ill-defined area of prohibited
transactions existed with regard to the 501(c) exempt trust created
under the plan. Some registration requirements existed under labor-
67. I.R.C. § 411(a)(7)(C).
68. I.R.C. § 411(a).
69. I.R.C. § 411(a)(1).
70. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
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related laws.7' Administrative provisions were developed largely by
practice and custom with District Directors again using the deter-
mination letter to require equitable considerations. For years, anti-
self-dealing legislation has existed for plans for self-employed indi-
viduals, but it was never applied to corporate qualified plans. The
net result was that the relationship between the employer, the trus-
tee and the plan was very fuzzy. It was not uncommon to see finan-
cial transactions between the two on a continuing basis. The lease
of property owned by the plan to the employer was extremely com-
mon.
ERISA changed this area of the law dramatically. A whole new
administrative system was established within the Department of
Labor, and a set of laws applicable to the private pension system
was imposed. These laws define the nature of the fiduciary relation-
ship and the transactions that may occur between and amongst the
various parties involved in plan administration. They further regu-
late investments and provide other safeguards for plan assets. Most
of these requirements do not have to be incorporated into the plan
document. The plan administrator, nevertheless, must be aware of
their existence and must govern his activities accordingly.
The first requirement appears to be rather simple. This is the
requirement that the plan be in writing.72 The written document
must name an agent for the service of legal process, must name a
plan administrator, and must state the identity of a "named fidu-
ciary. 7 3 The act defines "fiduciary" as a person exercising any dis-
cretionary authority or discretionary control respecting the manage-
ment or disposition of plan assets or rendering investment advice for
a fee or other compensation or an individual exercising any discre-
tionary authority or responsibility for the plan administration. 7 A
person may be within the definition of a "fiduciary" without being
the named fiduciary in the plan document. Nonetheless, the docu-
ment itself must name a fiduciary.
The plan administrator is the person charged with responsibili-
ties of filing documents, making decisions under the plan itself,
communicating with participants, etc. Often in the case of a small
business, this position is held by the employer with a separate trus-
tee. The fiduciary may be a participant. The Act goes on to prohibit
persons convicted of certain crimes from holding any of these posi-
71. I.R.C. § 503(a).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2); ERISA § 402.
73. ERISA § 502(d).
74. ERISA § 3(21).
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tions of responsibility. 5
Once designated, a fiduciary must be bonded unless otherwise
exempt.6 The bond required is at least 10% of the amount of funds
handled, but the bond need not exceed $500,000 unless specifically
required by the Secretary of Labor. There are several exemptions
from this bonding requirement, and generally professional fiduciar-
ies such as banks and trust companies are exempt. 77
In regulating the activities of fiduciaries, the labor provisions
of the law specifically impose a prudent man rule. 7 Generally, prior
to ERISA, these rules were reserved for state trust laws. Under
sections 404 and 407 of the Pension Reform Act, however, a fiduci-
ary must carry out his duties with the care, skill, prudence and dili-
gence which a prudent man acting in a like capacity would use
under conditions prevailing at the time.
The definition of "party in interest" is necessary to fully com-
prehend the Labor Department provisions of the plan. That term is
defined to include employers of plan participants; persons rendering
services to the plan; unions whose members are plan participants,
their officers and agents; officers, fiduciaries and employees of a
plan; and relatives, agents and joint venturers of any of the forego-
ing.7 9
Section 406 of ERISA sets out a series of prohibited transac-
tions generally designed to prevent a plan from dealing with parties
in interest and to prevent the fiduciary from dealing with plan as-
sets for his own benefit.80
Section 407 of the Act provides a 10% limitation on employer
securities and qualifying employer real property." Generally speak-
ing, individual account plans may hold qualifying employer securi-
ties and qualifying employer real property without limitation. The
provisions of section 407 are designed to reduce past practices of
using plan assets to provide a ready market for corporate stock and
to provide physical facilities for the employer.
The law was drafted to continue to allow certain practices
which were commonplace prior to ERISA and which involved direct
dealing between parties in interest and the plan. A prime example
of these practices is loans by the plan to plan participants. Section
75. ERISA § 411.
76. ERISA § 412(a).
77. ERISA § 412(a)(2).
78. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).
79. ERISA § 3(14).
80. ERISA § 406.
81. ERISA § 407.
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408(b)(1) 2 specifically allows such loans where the following re-
quirements are met:
A. Loans are made available to all participants and beneficiaries
on a reasonably equivalent basis.
B. Loans are not made available to highly compensated employ-
ees, officers or shareholders in an amount greater than the amount
made available to other employees.
C. Loans are made in accordance with specific provisions set
forth in the plan regarding such loans.
D. Loans bear a reasonable rate of interest.
E. Loans are adequately secured.
As with pre-ERISA plans, there is no reason to prevent the em-
ployee's vested interest in the plan from providing security for the
loan as long as a current distribution does not occur.
Prior to ERISA, the only real avenue of attack for violation of
the prohibited transaction rules was disqualification of the plan.
This was often not a palatable solution since it had the effect of
generally causing the termination of the plan and the loss of sub-
stantial benefits to innocent rank and file plan participants. The
new law substantially changes this procedure by the enactment of
Code section 4975. 3 This section imposes an excise tax on prohib-
ited transactions. The tax is equal to 5% of the amount involved in
the transaction and is imposed for the taxable year of the transac-
tion and for each subsequent year (or a portion thereof) while the
error is not corrected. The party in interest may be subject to an
additional 100% excise tax if the prohibited transaction is not cor-
rected after notice from the IRS.
In addition to the excise tax, the fiduciary standards provisions
of ERISA provide for criminal penalties of fines of up to $5,000,
imprisonment for not more than one year or both in the case of
intentional violations and also provide for civil liability of fiduciar-
ies who breach their fiduciary responsibility."4
Section 410(a) of the Act prevents avoidance of the fiduciary
responsibility laws through exculpatory provisions in the plan.85
Under that section, exculpatory provisions in an agreement that
relieve, or purport to relieve, a fiduciary from liability for breach of
the fiduciary responsibility rules are void. Regulations issued by the
Department of Labor make clear that this requirement does not
82. ERISA § 408(b)(1).
83. I.R.C. § 4975.
84. ERISA §§ 501, 502.
85. ERISA § 410(a).
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prohibit indemnification of a fiduciary by a third party. The em-
ployer, therefore, may purchase insurance to protect the fiduciary
from liability under the fiduciary standards provision or may enter
into an agreement to reimburse the fiduciary for any liability in-
curred .8
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
One area of major concern to the drafters of ERISA was the
quantity of information flowing to participants. Prior to specific
legislation, the information going to plan participants varied from
extremely attractive gilt-edged annual certificates and printed
booklets to virtually no information at all. The IRS required that
the salient features of a newly installed plan be communicated to
employees. After that the requirements were extremely vague and
often employees, whether plan participants or not, knew little about
the benefits they were accruing.
Alternatives for providing information to plan participants no
longer exist. A very specific pattern of information is required to be
supplied, and often participants find themselves with more infor-
mation than they really care to have. Upon initial submission of the
plan to the Internal Revenue Service for a letter of determination,
each employee must be notified of his right to participate in the
submission process, to comment upon plan provisions and to re-
quest the Department of Labor to comment. 7 The regulations pro-
vide for distributing or posting of this notice so that all employees
are informed adequately. A specific series of dates for comment
must be identified in the notice.8 8 The Department of Labor has
prepared a sample notice which can be used in most cases.
Section 102 of the Act details the requirements of a summary
plan description which must be provided each plan participant.8 9
The summary plan description replaces the administratively im-
posed plan summaries required for a favorable letter of determina-
tion prior to the passage of ERISA.10 The summary plan description
must be provided to plan participants by the later of ninety days
after they enter the plan or 120 days after the plan becomes subject
to ERISA reporting and disclosure requirements.1 Once issued, a
86. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (1977).
87. ERISA § 3001(a).
88. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(D)(3) (proposed).
89. ERISA § 102.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (pre-ERISA).
91. ERISA § 104(b).
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summary plan description must be updated no less frequently than
every ten years or, if there are plan amendments, every five years.
Significant amendments must be described to participants within
120 days after they are made. 2
The summary plan description must supply, at a minimum, the
following information:
1. Conditions which would disqualify a person from receiving
benefits.
2. Plan provisions on eligibility for participation and on benefit
vesting.
3. Identity of the plan's administrator and agent for service of
process.
4. Description of relevant portions of any applicable collective
bargaining agreement.
5. Source of the plan's financing and identity of any organization
through which benefits are provided.
6. Date when the plan year ends and plan's record-keeping
method.
7. Description of the plan's claims procedures and remedies if
claims are rejected.
In addition, the regulations require that the summary plan descrip-
tion contain a statement of ERISA rights."3 A basic form is provided
by the Department of Labor which customarily is incorporated into
the summary plan description." Further, the summary plan de-
scription must state that plan participants have a right to examine
the plan documents on the employer's premises at convenient loca-
tions and times and to have copies of plan documents made at a
reasonable cost.
Perhaps the most controversial reporting and disclosure re-
quirement of ERISA is that the plan description be written in lan-
guage calculated to be understood by the average participant. This
requirement has resulted in summary plan description booklets
with cute pictures of the fiduciary and plan administrator in sailor
hats at the helm of the retirement benefits ship and in plan descrip-
tion language calculated to be understood by the average first
grader. It may be suggested that drafters of summary plan descrip-
tions pursue a policy of reasonableness. Summary plan descriptions
can be cast in conversational language avoiding quotations from the
regulations' overly complex language.
Once completed, the summary plan description must be filed
92. Id.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (1977).
94. Id.
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with the Department of Labor in Washington. No form for filing is
specified, and it is common practice simply to mail the plan de-
scription, return receipt requested.
Once participants are supplied with their summary plan de-
scriptions, they are entitled to annual financial reports on the prog-
ress of the plan and on their accounts. This "summary annual re-
port" must be provided each participant within nine months after
the close of the plan's year. If an extension of time to file forms 5500
or 5500-C is granted, the summary annual report need not be fur-
nished until two months after the close of the extended period.
The summary annual report is required, by regulation, 5 to pro-
vide plan participants with at least the following information:
1. - Name of the plan.
2. Name of the employer.
3. Name, address and telephone number of the plan administra-
tor.
4. Statement of assets and liabilities presented at current value.
5. A statement of income and expenses.
6. Notes to financial statements.
7. Notice to plan participants that they may obtain more de-
tailed financial information concerning substantial transactions,
transactions with a party in interest, etc.
Small plans which are entitled to file form 5500-C may comply
with the summary annual report requirements simply by supplying
plan participants with a copy of the form 5500-C without schedules
and with a statement concerning their rights to additional informa-
tion. 6
For the small plan, once the hurdles of the summary plan de-
scription and initial summary annual report are passed, filing and
disclosure requirements become relatively simple. Combination
forms 5500 or 5500-C are filed with the Department of Labor and
Internal Revenue Service. As previously indicated, form 5500-C can
be used as a form of summary annual report.
95. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10 (1977).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(c)(2) (1977). Such statement shall read as fol-
lows:
Plan participants and beneficiaries may obtain copies of the following
more detailed annual report information for a reasonable charge or inspect
without charge: the latest, full annual report, including a list of certain
party-in-interest transactions. To obtain a copy of any documents listed,
write to the administrator asking for exactly what you want. The adminis-
trator will state the charge for specific documents on request, so that you
can find out the cost before ordering. All documents listed can be exam-
ined at [state locations where documents may be examined].
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FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
After the plan has been established and is functioning, the plan
administrator needs to be aware of the impact that certain funda-
mental changes in underlying statutory laws will have on the ad-
ministration of the plan. By way of example, prior administrative
practice described at Revenue Ruling 71-446 prohibited the plan
from using increased Social Security benefit levels or wage base to
reduce the benefits paid to retired employees already receiving ben-
efits as well as to separated employees with nonforfeitable rights. 7
ERISA has codified this practice at section 401(a)(15), and a quali-
fied plan must specifically reference this limitation. 8
As required prior to ERISA, the new law provides that benefits
need to be fully vested upon termination of the plan. Section
411(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code now provides that benefits
must be fully vested on partial termination of the plan."9 In addi-
tion, in the case of a profit-sharing plan, benefits must be fully
vested on complete discontinuance of contributions. 100 The latter
requirement does not apply to plans to which the minimum funding
standards are applicable since the excise tax is imposed to cover this
eventuality.
Section 401(a)(12) of the Code governs the circumstances of a
merger or consolidation of employers with a concomitant merger or
consolidation of plans. Each qualified plan must provide that in
such an eventuality the participant would be entitled to a benefit
after the merger which is at least equal to the value of the benefit
he would have been entitled to before the merger. In computing
these benefits, the before and after situations are determined as if
the plan had been terminated.
HR-10 PLANS
In 1962 the Self-employed Individuals Retirement Act, or HR-
10 as it has become commonly known, was enacted in order to
provide a system of private retirement benefits for self-employed
individuals. Since its passage it has been obvious that HR-10 plans
were so vastly different from other qualified retirement benefit
plans that there is really no comparison. Often, qualification for a
corporate retirement plan was the principal factor in deciding
whether to incorporate a business or not. Prior to ERISA, HR-10
97. Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187.
98. I.R.C. § 401(a)(15).
99. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3).
100. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3)(B).
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plans had a maximum contribution limit of 10% of earned income
or $2,500"0" and had no provisions for an estate tax exclusion or any
special tax benefits on lump sum distribution. A bank trustee was
mandatory, and defined benefit retirement plans were not avail-
able.
ERISA and post-ERISA legislation has changed most of these
provisions and made HR-10 plans, if not the equivalent of, at least
comparable to corporate employee benefit plans. ERISA increased
the contribution limitations to the lesser of 15% of earned income
or $7,500 with a possible minimum deduction equal to the lesser of
100% of earned income or $750. 102 An overall limitation of $100,000
has been established on earned income for purposes of determining
limitations on contributions.' Post-ERISA HR-10 plans qualify for
estate tax exclusion in much the same manner as qualified corpo-
rate plans.10 Lump sum distributions are entitled to preferential tax
treatment as in the case of corporate plans.10 5
It was specifically ERISA's intention to allow for non-bank
trustees of HR-10 plans and to permit the use of defined benefit
retirement plans for self-employed individuals. Regulations now
allow both of these alternatives, but it is obvious that the IRS disfa-
vors the former. Regulations issued regarding non-bank trustees of
HR-10 plans are not really of much help. Large institutional manag-
ers other than banks can qualify now; and many, such as the major
brokerage houses, are making use of these regulations. If an individ-
ual is trustee, under the regulations he or she probably will have to
demonstrate great wealth, integrity and perhaps most difficult,
immortality. One must wonder whether the will of Congress is being
carried out in this area. 06
101. I.R.C. § 404(e), amended by ERISA.
102. I.R.C. § 404.
103. I.R.C. § 401(a)(17).
104. I.R.C. § 2039.
105. I.R.C. § 401(a).
106. Treas. Reg. § 11.401(d)(1)-I requires that a non-bank trustee demon-
strate to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the manner in which he will
administer the trust will be consistent with the requirements of I.R.C. § 401. Such
demonstration must be made upon written application and satisfy the following
requirements as to fiduciary ability:
1. Continuity - assurance of uninterrupted performance notwith-
standing death or change of owners and sufficient diversity.
2. Established location.
3. Fiduciary experience.
4. Fiduciary responsibility.
5. Financial responsibility including net worth in excess of the
greater of $100,000 or 4% of the value of the assets held, etc.
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IRA
Prior to the passage of ERISA, the pension laws, when com-
pared with other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, consti-
tuted a veritable desert of anagrams. Although not specifically iden-
tified in the committee reports, it was obviously Congress' intention
to rectify this situation by the passage of ERISA. In addition to such
household words as ERISA itself, ESOP, PBGC (saying it as an
anagram isn't easy), SPD, etc., the Pension Reform Act brought us
IRA. IRA stands for individual retirement account. This is an en-
tirely new concept in retirement planning codified at sections 219,
408 and 409 of the Internal Revenue Code.
An IRA is designed for persons who otherwise are not covered
by qualified retirement benefits such as corporate plans or.HR-10
plans. Such an individual, or his employer, may contribute up to
the lesser of 15% of compensation or $1,500 to a qualified IRA.'10 '
None of the participation or vesting provisions of ERISA apply to
IRA's since they are on an individual basis only and'm'ay be discrim-
inatory. All interest of individuals in the account must be nonfor-
feitable at all times. The fiduciary is required to be a bank or other
suitable person as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. No
part of the funds are allowed to be invested in life insurance con-
tracts.108 Legislation subsequent to ERISA has allowed for IRA's for
persons who will receive future military retirement benefits and for
spouses of persons qualified to participate in the IRA.' °9
IRA's were intended to correct one additional problem of pre-
ERISA law: the tax levied on lump sum distribution to persons not
ready for retirement. Under ERISA as modified by the Revenue Act
of 1978, an IRA can be used for a tax-free rollover."10 An individual
receiving a lump sum distribution from a qualified plan may rein-
vest all or a portion of the distribution in a qualified IRA within
sixty days after receipt and avoid current taxation. The same is true
for distribution made within one taxable year not qualifying as
lump sum distribution but made at the termination of a plan or at
the receipt of a lump sum distribution from a qualified plan by a
surviving spouse of plan participant.
Once established, funds constituting an IRA account are
treated in much the same fashion for tax purposes as an HR-10
account.
107. I.R.C. § 408(a).
108. Id.
109. I.R.C. § 219(c)(4).
110. I.R.C. § 408.
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A GAGGLE OF IRA's
In an attempt to simplify retirement planning even further,
Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1978, provided for employer quali-
fied plans using the IRA concept. The result is essentially a gaggle
of IRA's, one for each of' the employee-participants. Concepts
drawn from both the IRA and the HR-10 plan have been aggre-
gated to constitute this type of benefit.
The 1978 amendment allows a maximum contribution of the
lesser of 15% of compensation or $7,500 on behalf of any participant
in this simplified plan."' The plan incorporates general rules of
nondiscrimination in favor of officers, shareholders of self-employed
individuals and further requires a definite and written allocation
formula." 2
As with the normal IRA, all employee benefits must be vested.
The allocation formula, nevertheless, may provide for a minimum
entry age of twenty-five and performance of services on behalf of the
employer in at least three of the preceding five calendar years." 3
Contrary to the general rule for IRA's, participation in this type of
plan is not precluded by participation in another qualified retire-
ment plan.
The underlying rationale of the simplified pension plan is that
an employer will establish a method of contribution, coverage, etc.
in much the same fashion as if it were establishing a regular quali-
fied plan. To ease the burdens of administration, however, the em-
ployer will have no further fiduciary or other responsibilities once
the contribution is made. The relationship then will be among the
employee-participant, his or her beneficiary and the corporate
fiduciary. The employer will treat the contributions as solely the
property of the employee-participant and will not have to worry
about the complexities of such things as break in service, vested
benefits and fiduciary responsibilities.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
For many years, the Internal Revenue Service has used the
determination letter as a club to coerce the institution of certain
plan provisions where the legal requirements were not precise. From
a practical standpoint, this club was a formidable weapon,. There is
not now nor has there ever been a requirement that a qualified plan
be submitted to the IRS for a letter of determination. Nevertheless,
111. I.R.C. § 408(j).
112. I.R.C. §§ 408(k)(3)(A), 408(K)(5).
113. I.R.C. § 408(k)(2)(B).
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the practice of submitting the plans and of obtaining a letter from
the District Director's Office stating that the plan meets require-
ments for qualification and that the trust is exempt from taxation
has developed over the years. Each employer wants one of these
letters in his files to show an auditing agent who might scrutinize
retirement plan contributions.
What was a plan sponsor to do if he submitted his plan for a
letter of determination and the IRS verbally advised him that the
plan did not qualify? He was then put on notice that any contribu-
tions to such a plan might be challenged. He could withdraw his
application for a letter of determination or he simply could wait and
have an adverse letter of determination issued. In either event, the
employer that wanted to stick to the plan submitted had only one
method of final determination as to qualification. He had to make
a contribution to the plan to take a deduction on his income tax
return and to wait for the auditing staff either to challenge that
deduction, to challenge the failure of the employee to include the
contribution in income or to challenge the exempt status of the
retirement trust. The case then could be contested in court as a
protest to the disallowance or inclusion. Obviously, this was a hard
way to fight the battle. If it turned out that the IRS was right,
substantial financial penalties resulted.
ERISA added Code section 7476 to resolve this problem. It
provides for a declaratory judgment procedure in the case of quali-
fied retirement plans."4 That section requires the employer first to
exhaust administrative remedies by applying for IRS approval.
Once the application is submitted, the IRS has 270 days to hand
down its determination, and the employer then has 90 days to file
for a declaratory judgment before the Tax Court."5 This is not a
tremendously expeditious procedure; but it is no slower than prior
to ERISA, and it does not require the gamble of making the contri-
bution and daring the IRS to do something about it.
PATTERN PRACTITIONER PLANS & MODEL PLANS
Most law firms handling a substantial volume of pension and
profit-sharing plans have had the experience of routinely submitting
the same forms for the plans of several different employers and the
IRS has required different modifications to each plan to obtain a
favorable determination letter. This exemplifies the lack of consist-
ency previously discussed. It was not unusual for different examin-
114. I.R.C. § 7476.
115. I.R.C. §§ 7476(a), 7476(b)(3).
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ers in the same IRS office to impose different requirements on em-
ployers. On March 17, 1976, the IRS issued procedures for what
commonly has been termed the "pattern practitioner plan.""' ' '
Under this procedure a law firm could submit a plan for a "notifi-
cation letter" with the intention that the plan would be used much
in the same fashion as master plans are used by sponsoring banks,
etc. Under Revenue Procedure 76-15, a sponsoring law firm may
submit up to two defined benefit, defined contribution or profit-
sharing plans. The firm must represent that it has a reasonable
expectation that the pattern plans will be. adopted by more em-
ployers. The request for a pattern practitioner notification letter
must be in conjunction with a normal employer's submission for a
client.
The request must contain a pattern plan separate from the
employer's plan that is being submitted for qualification. The sepa-
rate pattern plan would contain blanks for all variables allowed the
adopting employer. Once a favorable determination letter is issued
with regard to the pattern practitioner plan, such plan may be
adopted by additional employers who would then submit for qualifi-
cation based upon their employee census and individual facts with-
out reference to the detailed terminology in the plan.
To simplify adoption of a qualified retirement plan even fur-
ther, the Internal Revenue Service has issued its own model plans.
These plans, IRS forms 5612, 5613, 5614 and 5615, may be used
either to amend bxisting plans or to adopt new plans. The model
plans are for corporate employers and therefore cannot be used by
persons desiring to adopt a self-employed retirement plan or an IRA.
If adopted in their entirety, the model plans can be qualified
through the IRS by a simple certification procedure rather than the
more lengthy informal determination letter process.
SIMPLIFIED FILING
The vast majority of qualified retirement plans involve small
businesses with relatively few employees. The aspect of ERISA
which caused most concern to practitioners was the series of com-
plex filing requirements with both the Internal Revenue Service and
the Department of Labor. Those representing small businesses
could foresee horrendously burdensome administrative costs that
potentially could spell the doom of the small plan.
The Internal Revenue Service as well as the Department of
Labor realized the potentially adverse consequences of reporting
requirements and took action to consolidate required forms and to
116. Rev. Proc. 76-15, 1976-1 C.B. 553.
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ease the burden of the small plan.
After several abortive drafts; the Department of Labor devel-
oped a form EBS-1 (plan description) which must be filed with the
Secretary of Labor within 120 days after a plan becomes subject to
the reporting and disclosure requirements of ERISA. The EBS-1
form, initially a monster of complexity, is now a relatively simple
form which should give the plan administrator few problems.
The same series of events surrounded the adoption of an annual
reporting system to the Department of Labor and to the Internal
Revenue Service. It first was contemplated that different forms
would be required to be completed and to be filed separately at each
of the administrative agencies. This problem has been resolved by
the completion of the various forms 5500. They provide for a single
annual filing for both of the administrative agencies and allow for
form 5500-C where the sponsoring plan has fewer than 100 partici-
pants. As previously indicated, in order to simplify the procedures,
the first two pages of form 5500-C can be used as the summary
annual report. Plan sponsors that may file form 5500-C also are
exempt from the annual requirement of certification by a certified
public accountant.
The 5500 series of reporting forms has replaced pre-ERISA
forms 990-B, 4848, 4848 Schedule A and 4849. A comparison of these
documents will reveal that post-ERISA filing requirements are
shorter, simpler and easier to handle than their pre-ERISA prede-
cessors. One change is the penalty for failure to file. The law now
allows for a penalty of up to $10.00 per day for failure to file the
required forms on time.
CONCLUSION
Enough time has elapsed to permit the examination of ERISA
in retrospect: to view it in light of what it was intended to do and
what it actually has done. After many years the statute was brought
up to date with the complex regulatory framework and the immense
retirement system it was designed to govern. It indeed would be a
miracle if such a gigantic step were accomplished with facility and
were accepted immediately by the people regulated. Such easy re-
form does not occur often. It did not happen when the private foun-
dation rules were changed substantially in 1969 or when the estate
tax laws were overhauled in 1976.
The need was nevertheless there. Pre-ERISA law bestowed tax
benefits upon those maintaining private retirement programs. Ob-
viously, Congress had concluded, as a matter of social policy, that
taxpayers should encourage such a private retirement system. Basi-
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cally, however, the law stopped there. It did not define the entity
entitled to such benefits; it gave little guidance as to who among the
employees must be covered, and it provided few limitations on con-
tributions and benefits. Perhaps most importantly the law failed to
intervene in protection of the rights of employee-participants. A
private pension system is designed to encourage the payment of
retirement benefits to the broad cross section of workers and thus
to supplement social security payments. It is hard to imagine how
these goals are being accomplished when, for example, a rank and
file participant is denied benefits for securing employment with a
competing employer or is discharged shortly before attaining normal
retirement age with no vested benefits.
As previously indicated, administrative requirements in the
regulations, in the rulings, in Isidore Goodman commentaries and
in the requirements of each District Director attempted to correct
pre-ERISA shortcomings. The result was a patchwork quilt of in-
consistent rules often of dubious validity.
ERISA and subsequent legislation represents a genuine at-
tempt on the part of the Congress to meet its responsibilities, pre-
viously simply dumped on administrative agencies. There is no
doubt that this has resulted in overkill to some degree. As with other
legislation, there is a need for congressional oversight review and
benign administration during the period of absorption. This is oc-
curring. The Williams-Javits Bill introduced in Congress and the
President's ERISA Reform Directive appear to be moving in the
right direction. Nevertheless, scare stories concerning the horrors of
administration continue to appear in print, and supposedly knowl-
edgeable commentators rue the day that ERISA was passed.
The practicing Bar must recognize that ERISA represents the
coming of age of pension and profit-sharing legislation. For us to
react to the complexities by abandoning this extremely important
planning tool is to do a disservice to our clients and to the broad
cross section of working people who so badly need this supplement
to what may well be woefully inadequate social security benefits.
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